2 edition of implications of the Chinese nuclear force for U.S. strategic and arms control policies found in the catalog.
implications of the Chinese nuclear force for U.S. strategic and arms control policies
Ralph N. Clough
|Statement||prepared by Ralph N. Clough, project director ... [et al.].|
|Contributions||United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.|
|LC Classifications||JX1974.7 .C477|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||2 v. ;|
|LC Control Number||74602366|
CHINA’S NUCLEAR FORCES: OPERATIONS, TRAINING, DOCTRINE, COMMAND, CONTROL, AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING Larry M. Wortzel May This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined. Evolving Chinese Thinking About Deterrence: The Nuclear Dimension Dean Cheng the difference between u.s. and Chinese in his book, Arms and Influence.
A Study of China’s No-First-Use Policy on Nuclear Weapons Zhenqiang Pan (Retired) Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University PLA, Beijing, China ABSTRACT China’s no-ﬁrst-use policy implies that the country possesses nuclear weapons only to deter other states from a nuclear Cited by: 1. Seapower Questions on the Chinese Submarine Force, U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, Decem Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning (FAS/NRDC, November ) White Paper on China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.
Lessons from North Korean Denuclearization: Implications for Nonproliferation, Arms Control and the Nuclear Taboo. By: arms control and the norm of nuclear non-use then there could be a domino effect starting with aggressive Chinese and North Korean force posture changes and increases in nuclear weapon development, which could cross. Moscow seems to value constraints on U.S. nuclear forces, and as the U.S. strategic modernization effort moves into high gear in the early s, Russia could be keen to maintain arms .
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Get this from a library. The implications of the Chinese nuclear force for U.S. strategic and arms control policies: prepared for the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. [Ralph N Clough; United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.]. The strategic arms control process to reduce nuclear weapons and contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a center piece of the United States arms control policy.
To be effective in arms control negotiations with the Chinese, the United States must understand China's past experience and perspectives regarding nuclear Size: KB. China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control U.S. interests vis-a`-vis China’s strategic modernization pro-gram and how best to secure outcomes consistent with U.S.
Few challenges loom as large on the U.S. foreign policy agenda as the effective management of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). This is a perennial challenge, given China's central role in Asia and the many issues on the bilateral agenda that feature prominently in U.S.
domestic politics. Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Control and Regional Security Article in The Nonproliferation Review 10(1). When we use the term “nuclear arms control without a treaty,” we are referring to cooperative options that serve these objectives through means other than a treaty.
In practice, the United States has relied upon strategic nuclear arms control with Russia to further these objectives by fulfilling one primary role and. Chinese Perceptions on Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation the United States should seek to engage in high-level dialogues with China to clarify each other’s nuclear policies.
instead the methodology necessary to assess U.S. nuclear force requirements and arms control positions. The study first contrasts the basic contours of official U.S. policy with public proposals for new nuclear disarmament treaties, and.
China will optimize its nuclear force structure, improve strategic early warning, command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and protection, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China.".
For example, though a kinetic or nonkinetic attack on U.S. nuclear command and control capabilities, which support both nuclear and non-nuclear missions, could have major repercussions, such an attack is unlikely to result in any human casualties.
the People’s Republic should cast these policies aside and adopt a new nuclear doctrine that will grant strategic forces a more prominent role in the country’s defense. External and internal factors are driving changes in China’s nuclear policy and force structure and will continue to do so in the future.
Concerns over what the Chinese. The People's Republic of China has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The first of China's nuclear weapons tests took place inand its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in Tests continued untilwhen China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
China has acceded to the Biological and First nuclear weapon test: Octo The minimum deterrence argument appears in Sutter, “Chinese nuclear weapons and arms control policies,” in my earlier work (e.g.
“Chinese nuclear force modernization: implications for arms control,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June ), and also in Wu Zhan, “Shilun zhanliie jingong wuqi” (“Preliminary Cited by: : China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Studies in International Security and Arms Control) (): Lewis, John Wilson, Litai, Xue: BooksCited by: National Intelligence Council China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States Conference Report Chinese nuclear doctrine and force structure.
Rather, an understanding of such variables as domestic political, technological, historical, and cultural factors. The US Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) are the nation’s primary statements of nuclear weapons policy, and each has been debated closely.
However, the NPR is unusual in that it has been subject not only to debate about the rectitude of its policies, but also about what those policies actually are. Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, Arms Control: Problems and Prospects (San Diego, CA, ); Lynn Eden and Steven E.
Miller, eds., Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates (Ithaca, NY, ); and Zhang Xiaoming, Lengzhan jiqi yichan [The Cold War and Its Heritages] (Shanghai, ).Author: Xin Zhan.
While official Chinese opposition to U.S. missile defenses became highly vocal and vehement only in the late s, the issue itself was nothing new to Beijing. Chinese ana- lysts carefully studied the implications of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars) in the early s.
Internal and external exchanges on security tradeoffs and arms control may dampen the pernicious effects of strategic competition. A broad and inclusive internal deliberation on the development and employment of new technologies like MIRVs can force states to weigh the costs, risks, and negative externalities.
of Chinese nuclear weapons policy relevant both to neighboring non-nuclear weapons states concerned about the possibil ity of China using its nuclear weap-ons to influence the outcome of territorial disputes and to U.S. military planners worried about a Chinese nu-clear response to a conventional U.S.
attack. It states that:File Size: KB. Varying perspectives on China's military modernization are presented against a framework that considers U.S.
national security policy, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and strategic trade with China, in addition to China's own nuclear deterrent and its military posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, Japan, and Southeast Asia.plans, special operations forces, homeland defense, missile defense, nuclear weapons and arms control policies, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, arms sales, and defense trade controls.
He served as U.S. ambassador to Finland in File Size: 1MB.New START caps U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals at 1, deployed warheads, deployed missiles and heavy bombers, and deployed and nondeployed missile launchers and bombers each.
It also put into place a rigorous inspection and verification regime, on which the U.S. military relies for knowledge about the Russian arsenal.